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Abstract— Most of the proposed key management protocols
for wireless sensor networks (WSNs) in the literature assume
that a single base station is used and that the base station is
trustworthy. However, there are applications in which multiple
base stations are used and the security of the base stations
must be considered. This paper investigates a key management
protocol in wireless sensor networks which include multiple base
stations. We consider the situations in which both the base
stations and the sensor nodes can be compromised. The proposed
key management protocol, mKeying, includes two schemes, a key
distribution scheme, mKeyDist, supporting multiple base stations
in the network, and a key revocation scheme, mKeyRev, used to
efficiently remove the compromised nodes from the network. Our
analyses show that the proposed protocol is efficient and secure
against the compromise of the base stations and the sensor nodes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are promising solutions
for many applications and security is an essential problem for
WSNs. Among all security issues in WSNs, key management
is a core mechanism to ensure the security of network services
and applications in WSNs.
Most of existing works in the literature consider a WSN
with a single base station. However, as the size of the sensor
network grows, the distances between the base station and the
associated sensor nodes also become larger. The increase in
the distances may result in the following changes:
• The performance of the network degrades due to the
increase in the packet loss as the size of the network
grows.
• The lifetimes of the sensor nodes are reduced due to the
high energy consumption involved in query-flooding and
data-retrieval between the sensor nodes and the single
base station.
• The lifetime of the sensor network is shortened dramati-
cally because the energy of the sensor nodes close to the
base station is exhausted quickly.
The deployment of multiple base stations in a sensor net-
work is a promising solution [1], [2]. By allowing multiple
base stations in a sensor field, we can reduce the distances
between the sensor nodes and the base stations, and thus
reduce the energy consumption in sensor nodes and improve
the performance of the sensor network.
In this paper, we consider a WSN with multiple base
stations. We consider the situations in which both the base
stations and the sensor nodes could be compromised. Since
the base stations are usually resource-rich devices, we assume
that the base stations can communicate with each other directly
using high speed wireless links. The base stations can work
cooperatively in data acquisition in the network. To detect a
compromised base station or a sensor node, intrusion detection
techniques are involved. Intrusion detection is out of the scope
of this paper. We assume that there are some methods to detect
a compromised base station or sensor node.
A key management protocol designed for a WSN with
multiple base stations must satisfy the following requirements:
1) The base stations and the sensor nodes can authenticate
the messages from each other.
2) The capture or compromise of any base stations should
not affect the security of the sensor network.
3) The capture or compromise of any sensor nodes should
not affect the security of the sensor network.
4) The capture or compromise of both a base station and
sensor nodes should not affect the security of the sensor
network.
In this paper, we propose a key management protocol,
mKeying, for the WSNs with multiple base stations. mKeying
includes two schemes, a key distribution scheme, mKeyDist,
supporting multiple base stations in the network, and a key
revocation scheme, mKeyRev, used to efficiently remove the
compromised nodes from the network.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
discusses related work. Section III presents the proposed key
management protocol and is followed by Section IV analyzing
the security and the performance of the proposed protocol.
Section V describes the simulations and results. Section VI
finally concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Many key management protocols have been specifically
designed for WSNs [3], however, most of the proposed key
management protocols consider a single base station in the
WSN and assume that the base station is trustworthy. In
consideration of multiple base stations and their security, none
of the current proposed key management protocols can be
directly used. For example, most proposed key management
protocols assume that each sensor node is preloaded with a
master key, shared by all nodes in the sensor network, or
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a pairwise key, shared with the base station [3]. A simple
clone of a base station to multiple base stations indicates
that all the base stations use the same master key or the
same key set of pairwise keys. Several issues arise under
such assumptions. First, the base station can authenticate
the messages from the sensor nodes; however, the sensor
nodes cannot authenticate the messages from the base stations.
Second, once a base station is captured or compromised, the
master key and the whole pairwise key set are exposed. As a
result, any adversaries with this key set can utilize the WSN
without incurring any cost to deploy the sensor network.
A few papers discussed multiple base stations in the litera-
ture [1], [2], [4]. However, most of the papers focus on how to
save energy and improve network lifetime by using multiple
base stations in the network. None of these works discussed
key management issues. In [5], the authors considered a sensor
network with multiple mobile base stations and proposed some
schemes to restrict a mobile base station without impeding
its capability to carry out any authorized operations for an
assigned task. However, the proposed revocation schemes were
based on local multicast and may be not scalable to large
sensor networks.
Next, we present our proposed key management protocol,
mKeying, for the WSNs with multiple base stations.
III. MKEYING: A KEY MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL FOR
WSNS WITH MULTIPLE BASE STATIONS
In this section, we propose a key management protocol,
mKeying, for WSNs with multiple base stations. We assume
that there are at most m base stations and n sensors in
the network (m  n). The base stations are deliberately
distributed in the field to ensure that each sensor node can
be reached by at least γ (γ < m) base stations within one
hop of communication range. The base stations and the sensor
nodes are identified by globally unique numbers called base
station identifier and sensor identifier respectively. There is no
overlapping between the base station identifier space and the
sensor identifier space.
mKeying includes two schemes, a key distribution scheme,
mKeyDist, and a key revocation scheme, mKeyRev. In the
remainder of this section, we first motivate and present an
overview of the mKeying protocol. Then, we introduce se-
curity model and demonstrate broadcast authentication, key
distribution, revocation, and bootstrap processes using the
mKeying protocol.
A. mKeying Overview
Our proposed key management protocol supports the estab-
lishment of five types of keys for each sensor node—pairwise
key, individual key, session key, encryption key and message
authentication code (MAC) key.
Pairwise key: Each sensor shares a pairwise key with
each of its immediate neighbors. The pairwise key is used
to generate the encryption key and the MAC key to ensure
data confidentiality and authentication.
Individual key: Each node has a unique key shared pairwise
with the base station. This key is used for the base station to
authenticate individual sensor node.
Session key: This is a global key shared by all nodes in
the network. The need for the session key is motivated by the
key revocation scheme. We present an efficient key revocation
scheme, KeyRev, for a WSN with single base station using a
globally distributed session key in [6]. In this paper, we extend
the KeyRev scheme to support multiple base stations in the
network (Section III-E).
Encryption key and message authentication code key:
The encryption key and the MAC key are used to ensure
the security of the communication in a sensor network. The
encryption key and the MAC key are derived from the pairwise
key and the session key (Section III-D).
B. Security model
In literature, most research studies assume that the base
station is trustworthy and consider only the compromise of
the sensor nodes. However, due to the hostile environments in
the deployment area, it is necessary to consider the security
of the base stations as well. In this paper, we consider the
situations in which both the base stations and the sensors can
be compromised.
C. Broadcast authentication
We limit the capability of broadcasting authentication mes-
sages only to the base stations. We adopt the practical
broadcast authentication protocol proposed in [7] to support
multiple base stations in the WSNs. Note that the broadcast
authentication protocol for WSNs with multiple base stations
must be properly designed. A simple clone of µTESLA
instance for each mobile base stations does not work. Two
schemes were proposed in [7]: a basic approach and a special
instantiation for long-lived senders. We use the second one.
D. mKeyDist, key distribution scheme
1) Pairwise key and individual key: The pairwise key and
the individual key can be set up using Blundo’s theory [8].
Before sensor nodes are distributed, the setup server ran-
domly generates a bivariate t-degree polynomial
f(x, y) =
t∑
i,j=0
aijx
iyj
over a finite field Fq where q is a prime number that is large
enough to accommodate a cryptographic key such that it has
the property of f(x, y) = f(y, x). For each sensor i, the setup
server computes a polynomial share of f(x, y), that is, f(i, y),
and loads the single-variate polynomial f(i, y) to the sensor
i. For any two sensor nodes i and j, node i can compute the
common key f(i, j) by evaluating f(i, y) at point j, and node
j can compute the same key f(j, i) = f(i, j) by evaluating
f(j, y) at point i. Thus, both the sensor i and the sensor j can
find the shared pairwise key.
The individual key can be set up in the same way. Before
the base stations are deployed, each base station j is loaded
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with a single-variate polynomial f(j, y). By exchanging the
identifiers between a base station and a sensor node, both the
base station and the sensor node can find the shared individual
key.
2) Session key: The session key is a global key shared by
all the nodes. We propose to use distributed key schemes such
as secure group communication schemes to generate a group
key among the base stations first. Then, the session key can be
derived from the group key and dynamically distributed to the
sensor nodes. The secure group communication schemes are
out of the scope of this paper. Please refer to [9] for details.
Let Kg be the group key generated by the secure group
communication scheme, the session key Kis in i-th session
can be derived from the group key using a pseudo-random
function G:
Kis = G(Kg, i)
The distribution of session key is based on the personal key
share distribution scheme [10]. Let Kis be the current session
key in the i-th session, the session key distribution process is
described below:
1) Secret share distribution: In the pre-distribution stage,
the setup server randomly picks m 2t-degree masking
polynomial, hj(x) = hj,0 + hj,1x+ · · ·+ hj,2tx2t, 1 ≤
j ≤ m, over Fq. Each sensor su is preloaded with the
personal secret, Su = {hj(u)|1 ≤ j ≤ m}. Each base
station bj gets the polynomial hj(x).
2) Distinct share broadcast: Given a set of revoked sensor
nodes, R = {r1, r2, · · · , rw}, w ≤ t, the base station
bj randomly picks a t-degree polynomial pj(x) and
constructs qj(x) = Kis − pj(x). Then, the base station
distributes the shares of t-degree polynomial pj(x) and
qj(x) to non-revoked sensors via the following broadcast
message:
M = {R} (1)
∪ {Pj(x) = g(x)pj(x) + hj(x)}
∪ {Qj(x) = g(x)qj(x) + hj(x)}
where the revocation polynomial g(x) is constructed as
g(x) = (x − r1)(x − r2) · · · (x − rw). The broadcast
authentication is ensured by the scheme in [7].
3) Session key recovery: If any non-revoked sensor nodes
su receives such a broadcast message, it evaluates
the polynomial Pj(x) and Qj(x) at point u and gets
Pj(u) = g(u)pj(u) + hj(u) and Qj(u) = g(u)qj(u) +
hj(u). Because su knows hj(u) and gj(u) = 0, it can
compute pj(u) = Pj(u)−hj(u)g(u) and qj(u) =
Qj(u)−hj(u)
g(u) .
su finally can compute the new session key Kis =
pj(u) + qj(u). The revoked sensors cannot recover the
session key because g(x) = 0.
A sensor node can recover multiple copies of the session
key since each sensor node can be reached by at least γ base
stations. A session key is only accepted when the sensor node
restores at least γ copies of the session key.
3) Encryption key and message authentication code key:
Let KA,B denote the pairwise key shared between the sensor
A and the sensor B, and Kis be the current session key. The
encryption key Kencr and the message authentication code
(MAC) key Kmac are calculated as follows [6]:
Kencr = F(MAC(KA,B ,Kis), 1)
Kmac = F(MAC(KA,B ,Kis), 2)
where F(K,x) is a pseudo-random function and x is an
integer 1 or 2 for generating Kencr or Kmac respectively.
The complete message A sends to B is:
A −→ B : {M |Ts}Kencr ,MAC(Kmac, {M |Ts}Kencr ) (2)
where M is the message, and Ts is the timestamp when sending
the message. The sensor B can calculate the same Kencr and
Kmac with the sensor A. Thus, B can authenticate and decrypt
the message.
E. mKeyRev, key revocation scheme
We consider three situations in the key revocation process:
the compromise of a base station, the compromise of a sensor
node, and the compromise of both a base station and a sensor
node. We assume that each sensor maintains a list: node
revocation list (NRL). A NRL includes all the entity (base
station or sensor node) identifiers which have been revoked in
the network. The revocation list is empty initially and will be
populated as the time goes by. The revocation list is checked
for any incoming and outgoing messages to ensure that only
the valid entities are involved in the network.
Case 1: When a base station is compromised, the compro-
mised base station needs to be removed from the network.
Since the security of the communication is ensured by the
encryption key and the MAC key which are both bound up
with the session key, the compromised base station can be
removed from the network if it cannot reveal the next session
key. To do this, the compromised base station will be forced
to leave the group and a new group key is generated. Thus,
when the new session key is distributed to the network, the
compromised base station will be removed from the network.
Since a sensor node accepts a session key only when it
can restore at least γ (γ < m) session keys for the same
session from the distinct share broadcast messages (Equation
1), an attacker must compromise γ base stations to start the
revocation attack.
Case 2: If a sensor node is found to be compromised, the
compromised sensor can be removed using the session key
distribution scheme. After the compromised sensor identifier
is added to the revocation list, the revoked sensor cannot
recover the new session key since g(x) = 0 and thus the
revoked sensor cannot reveal the new encryption keys and the
MAC keys. Although the compromised sensor still has the
pairwise keys with its neighboring nodes, it cannot decrypt
any messages and authenticate itself in the network.
Since the capability of broadcasting authentication messages
is limited to the base stations only (ensured by the scheme in
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[7]), a compromised sensor node cannot start the revocation
attack either.
Case 3: In case that both a base station and a sensor node
are compromised, the base station needs to be revoked first,
followed by the revocation of the sensor node. The detail steps
are described in Case 1 and Case 2.
F. Bootstrap
To bootstrap a WSN using mKeying, pre-distributed key
materials are required to be loaded on the sensor nodes before
they are deployed. These pre-distributed key materials include
the polynomials used to set up the pairwise key, the secret
shares to recover the session key, and the required materials
for broadcast authentication [7]. After the sensor nodes are
deployed, the pairwise keys are set up first, followed by the
distribution of the session key. Then, the encryption keys and
the MAC keys can be set up on the fly.
IV. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section we first discuss the security of the protocol.
Then, we analyze the computation, communication costs and
storage requirement of mKeying protocol.
A. Security analysis
Our proposed key management protocol—-mKeying, satis-
fies the following properties:
Property 1 Only the authorized sensors can communicate in
the network. The communication among the sensors is ensured
by the encryption key Kencr and the MAC key Kmac as shown
in Equation 2. Unauthorized sensors (outside attackers) cannot
participate the communication without proper assigned key
materials.
Property 2 The session key distribution process is secure.
The distribution of session key is based on the personal
key share distribution scheme [10]. A revoked sensor cannot
recover the session key because g(x) = 0. Since the broadcast
authentication is ensured by [7], an outside attacker cannot
masquerade a base station disseminating a session key and
start a revocation attack either.
Property 3 The key revocation scheme is secure inspite
of not removing the pre-distributed key materials at a com-
promised sensor node. Although, without removing the pre-
distributed key materials, the compromised sensor could re-
veal the pairwise keys, the adversaries cannot figure out the
encryption key Kencr and MAC key Kmac if the session
key is updated. In the worst case, an adversary might use
chosen plaintext attack to crack the session key, however, the
attack itself is also time consuming. As long as the session
key lifetime is less than the session key cracking time, the
proposed key revocation scheme is secure.
B. Performance analysis
Because base stations are usually regarded as resource-rich
nodes, we focus on the performance of sensor nodes:
1) Computation cost: There are five different types of keys
in our proposed protocol. To calculate the pairwise key, the
individual key, and the session key, polynomial evaluation
is required. The computation of polynomial evaluation is
efficient. The calculation of the encryption key and the MAC
key is based on a pseudo-random function. Thus, the key
distribution scheme is efficient in computation.
2) Communication cost: Since the setup of the pairwise
key and the individual key does not involve any extra message
exchanges among the sensor nodes and the base stations (the
base station identifier and the sensor identifier can be send
along with a message between the sensor node and the base
station), we focus on the distribution of the session key. The
session key is distributed to the network using broadcasting
message in one round. The maximum size of the broadcast
message in bits is decided by S = (5t + 2) log q. Assume
B indicate the transmission rate of the base stations, L be
the maximum range between the base stations and the sensor
nodes. The session key distribution time can be calculated as:
ts =
S
B
+
L
3 ∗ 108 ≈
(5t + 2) log q
B
(the propagation delay is very small compared with the
transmission time). In case a sensor node is compromised,
no extra messages are required to remove the compromised
sensor node.
3) Storage requirement: Let d represent the number of
neighboring nodes around a sensor and m be the number of
the base stations. Each sensor node need d storage units for
the pairwise keys, m storage units for the individual keys, and
three storage units for the session key, the encryption key and
the MAC key. In addition, to calculate the pairwise key and
the individual key, each sensor need t + 1 storage units for
the t-degree polynomial and each sensor has also to be loaded
with m secret shares to recover the session key. Thus, the total
storage units of keys required for each sensor is 2m+d+t+4.
V. SIMULATIONS AND DISCUSSION
The proposed key distribution scheme, mKeyDist, does not
require any extra message exchanges among the sensor nodes
and the base stations. Thus, the key distribution scheme does
not add any extra communication overhead. In this section,
we focus on the performance of the key revocation scheme,
mKeyRev. We evaluated the performance of the mKeyRev
scheme in SENSIM, a component-based discrete-event sim-
ulator for sensor networks. We consider two sensor network
experimental settings: a small-scale sensor network with 100
nodes uniformly dispersed in a field with dimension 100m×
100m and a large-scale sensor network with 1000 nodes
uniformly dispersed in a field with dimension 2000m×2000m.
In both the networks, we assume each sensor node can be
reached by at least four base stations (γ = 4).
We compare the mKeyRev scheme with the centralized key
revocation scheme in [3] (referred to as EsRev scheme) and
the GPSR-based revocation scheme proposed in [5] (referred
to as the GPSRRev scheme). Both of the schemes, EsRev
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scheme and GPSRRev scheme, are designed for single-base-
station WSNs. For these two schemes, we assume the base
station is located at the center of field. We further assume that
the sensor filed in the GPSRRev scheme is divided into four
subareas.
The evaluation metrics include the key revocation time
and the average energy consumption per node to revoke a
compromised sensor in the network. The key revocation time
is the time duration from when the key revocation protocol
starts until all the uncompromised sensor nodes receive the
key revocation message. We consider the mKeyRev scheme
operating on a finite field Fq, where q is a 56-bit integer. The
polynomial degree t in the mKeyRev scheme is set to four. We
use the simulator parameters that represent the Mica2 Mote
radio characteristics. For each test, we randomly select one
sensor to be revoked and run the simulation ten times. The
average value is measured.
Tables I and II show the key revocation time and the average
energy consumption to revoke a compromised sensor node in
the two sensor networks. As the tables show, the GPSRRev
and the mKeyRev schemes are much better than the EsRev
scheme in both the key revocation time and the average energy
consumption per node. The GPSRRev scheme is better than
the mKeyRev scheme in the key revocation time in the small-
scale sensor network; however, the mKeyRev scheme is better
than the GPSRRev scheme in the large-scale sensor network.
Further, in both of the networks, the mKeyRev scheme con-
sumes less energy than the EsRev and the GPSRRev schemes.
Note that the key revocation time and the average energy
consumption to revoke a single sensor node by using mKeyRev
scheme have only a slight difference between the 100-node
sensor network and the 1000-node sensor network. It indicates
that the mKeyRev scheme is scalable to large-scale sensor
networks. The good performance of the mKeyRev scheme is
due to the efficient session key distribution scheme shown in
Section III-D. The mKeyRev scheme is the best in overall
performance for removing a compromised sensor node in the
network.
TABLE I
KEY REVOCATION TIME.
100-node WSN 1000-node WSN
Scheme Time (seconds) Time (seconds)
EsRev 49.63 496.06
GPSRRev 1.02 4.04
mKeyRev 2.36 2.48
TABLE II
AVERAGE ENERGY CONSUMPTION TO REVOKE A COMPROMISED SENSOR.
100-node WSN 1000-node WSN
Scheme Energy (joules) Energy (joules)
EsRev 0.71 7.14
GPSRRev 0.19 0.29
mKeyRev 0.04 0.04
Notice that the proposed protocol requires a session key to
be distributed to the network during each session. The duration
of the session time could be set and adjusted dynamically
according to the application to reduce the background traffic
in the sensor network. In addition, a few papers [11], [12]
have been proposed to address the key management issues
in heterogeneous sensor networks which can also be used to
improve the performance of the sensor network when the size
of the network grows. We are confident that our proposed
protocol can also be applied to heterogeneous sensor networks.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we propose a key management protocol,
mKeying, for wireless sensor networks with multiple base
stations. mKeying includes two schemes, mKeyDist and
mKeyRev. Unlike most existing key management protocols
for wireless sensor networks which assume that a single base
station is used and the base station is trustworthy, the mKeying
protocol supports multiple base stations and considers the
situations in which both the base stations and the sensor nodes
can be compromised. Our analyses show that the proposed
protocol is efficient and secure against the compromise of the
base stations and the sensor nodes.
In this paper, we assume that an appropriate routing protocol
is used to support multiple base stations in the network.
Further investigations include the security issues related to
data acquisition and the routing issues arising in supporting
multiple base stations.
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